헤지펀드의 위안화 공격에 대해 면밀한 검토와 의문이 제기되고 있다

 

헤지펀드의 위안화 공격에 대해 면밀한 검토와 의문이 제기되고 있다

세일러   2016.02.24. 10:13http://cafe.daum.net/urifuture/XoCB/418

 

1. 중국에도전한 헤지펀드 매니저 카일 베스(Kyle Bass)의 편지 전문 번역 2. 헤지펀드의 위안화 공격에 대해 면밀한 검토와 의문이 제기되고 있다 며칠 전 소개해드린 하이먼 캐피탈의 카일 베스(Kyle Bass)는 편지에서, 중국의 외환보유고 중 1조 달러 상당액은 유동성이 부족한 자산에 묶여 있으므로 ‘가용’ 외환보유고에서 제외해야 한다고 주장했습니다.   그의 편지가 전 세계적인 관심을 불러일으키면서, 그의 주장에 대해 여러 방면에서 검토가 이루어졌고, 그 결과 의문이 제기되고 있다고 파이낸셜타임스가 보도했습니다.   저는 아래 파이낸셜타임스의 기사 내용이 사실이라고 하더라도, 여전히 중국의 외환보유고에 무언가 구조적인 문제가 있다고 생각합니다.  이에 대해서는 별도의 글을 작성해보려고 합니다. 그런데 그 전에 아래 기사 중 두 군데 해석을 확정 지어야 할 곳이 있습니다.   ‘금융’이 추상적인 분야이다 보니, 이를 서술한 영문을 한국어로 옮길 때는 자칫하면 번역이 잘못될 우려가 있습니다. 예를 들어 카일 베스를 비판하는 주장들을 소개한 내일신문의 기사는, 아래 파이낸셜타임스의 기사를 많이 인용하면서 써나가고 있는데, 잘못 해석한 내용이 포함되어 있습니다.   그 때문에 아래 기사의 내용 중 두 군데(중간에 밑줄을 긋고 아울러 한글 해석을 덧붙여둔 곳입니다)에 대한 저의 해석이 맞는 것인지 여러분들의 조언을 듣고 싶습니다.   살펴보시고 의견 주시면 감사하겠습니다.   ------------------------------------------------------- 원 글의 출처 링크 : http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aaebbe02-d45b-11e5-969e-9d801cf5e15b.html#axzz4101BudPG     February 16, 2016 9:02 am Hedge funder’s attack on renminbi draws scrutiny and doubt Gabriel Wildau in Shanghai     Economists pick apart Hayman Capital’s $1tn ‘adjustment’ of China’s forex reserves   A high-stakes battle between China’s central bank and speculators taking aim at the renminbi escalated last week with US hedge fund manager Kyle Bass’s starkly worded letter to investors predicting a Chinese debt and currency crisis. Zhou Xiaochuan, People’s Bank of China governor, broke months of silence at the weekend with comments playing down the decline of China’s foreign exchange reserves to a more than three-year low and stressing that Beijing was not seeking to deval‎ue its currency. This came a few weeks after state media warned George Soros against“declaring war” on the renminbi. The war of words is likely to have real-world consequences: Chinese authorities are well aware that perception often equals reality in financial markets, as bearish sentiment becomes self-fulfilling when investors flee en masse. Mr Bass’s letter found a receptive audience because it played into two popular themes: alarm at capital flight and scepticism over Chinese statistics, which many people presume to be fabricated. There is just one problem: one of Mr Bass’s key claims about China’s foreign exchange reserves data — and thus the central bank’s ability to defend the exchange rate against further depreciation — does not hold up to scrutiny, experts say. At $3.2tn, China’s stated forex reserves remain the world’s largest. Economists broadly agree China requires about $2tn to meet the International Monetary Fund’s standard for reserve adequacy, based on what a country needs to pay for imports and meet foreign debt obligations. But Mr Bass says China’s true reserves are more than $1tn below the headline total, once necessary “adjustments” to official data are made. With less forex ammunition on hand than widely believed, the argument goes, the People’s Bank of China will be forced to scale back its defence of the currency. Mr Bass’s hedge fund Hayman Capital has wagered billions that the renminbi and other Asian currencies will depreciate, joining hedge funds such as David Einhorn’s Greenlight Capital and London-based Omni Partners. The biggest“adjustment” Mr Bass makes is $700bn in reserves he says is tied up in the sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corp. Launched in 2007, CIC’s mission was to raise returns on China’s foreign wealth, which was invested in US Treasuries and other low-yielding assets. By definition, these assets are less liquid and not intended to be deployed in currency markets. However, China economists say CIC’s assets are not included in the main forex reserves data that investors watch closely. When CIC was set up in 2007, China’s ministry of finance issued special bonds to the PBoC in exchange for a tranche of $200bn in foreign-exchange assets. The bonds filled the hole in the PBoC’s balance sheet that would have resulted from a simple transfer of assets. As domestic renminbi bonds, they are not classified among China’s forex reserves. “This is pretty clear based on public disclosure and information,” said Tao Wang, China economist at UBS — although she acknowledged that “nothing is 100 per cent”. Eswar Prasad, former head of the IMF’s China division, agreed that CIC assets are not counted. “If FX reserves were being used directly [in CIC], it’s not clear why the MoF would have to issue bonds,” he said. Classifying CIC assets as official reserves would also amount to a clear violation of IMF rules, which China agreed last year, for how reserves must be defined and reported. The IMF says only funds that are “readily available to the monetary authorities” may be counted as reserves. As a subsidiary of the finance ministry, CIC fails that test.   국부펀드(CIC)의 자산을 공식 외환보유고로 분류하는 것은 또한 IMF의 규칙을 명백하게 위반하는 것이 될 것이다, 그 규칙은 중국이 작년에 동의한 것인데, 외환보유고가 어떻게 규정되어야 하고 보고되어야 하는지에 관한 것이다.   “If the assets are not on the PBoC’s balance sheet, then in principle FX holdings cannot be counted as part of reserves,” said Mr Prasad. Jianguang Shen, chief economist at Mizuho Securities Asia, said he had verified with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (Safe), a unit of China’s central bank, that CIC assets are not included in their reserves. Safe did not respond to request for comment. “I think [Mr Bass’s] report is mistaken,” said Mr Shen, who previously worked at the IMF and European Central Bank. Mr Shen also notes that, in 2007, Safe was happy to relinquish forex assets, because “twin surpluses” on both the current and financial accounts were flooding the central bank with more foreign assets than they could effectively manage. The US and Europe were also criticising China for fuelling global financial imbalances. “At that time, Chinese authorities were actually embarrassed that reserves were rising all the time. They took a lot of blame for having too much reserves,” said Mr Shen. Transfers of forex wealth from the PBoC to CIC after 2007 were not publicly disclosed but were probably handled similarly and in any case never matched the size of the initial tranche. Ms Wang estimates them at less than $100bn.   2007년 이후에 외환자산이 중국인민은행(PBoC)으로부터 국부펀드(CIC)로 이전된 내역은 공개적으로 밝혀져 있지 않다. 하지만 아마도 유사한 방식(2007년에 초기자본을 이전시킨 방식을 지칭하는 것으로 보임. 기사 전반부에 그 내용이 있으며, 밑줄을 그어두었음)으로 처리되었을 것이며, 어떤 경우에도 결코 처음의 이전분(2007년의 2천억달러를 지칭하는 것으로 보임) 만큼의 크기는 되지 않을 것이다. Ms. 왕은 1천억 달러 이하로 추정하고 있다. Mr Bass does not explain his $700bn figure but he may be extrapolating large undisclosed transfers based on the rapid growth of CIC’s total assets. Yet Ms Wang notes that such an estimate probably fails to account for the large capital appreciation of CIC’s portfolio, notably from its shares in state-owned banks, which have seen their market capitalisation grow enormously since 2007. Hayman Capital did not respond to a request for comment. “The idea that the People’s Bank (of China) is running out of FX reserves doesn’t stand up to scrutiny,” Mark Williams, China economist at Capital Economics, wrote in a note on Monday. “But the fact that many take it seriously is a sign of how far sentiment has swung against China.”